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Abstract
The paper attempts to construct a theoretical account of what melancholy—in a 
psychoanalytical and cultural sense—may mean for jurisprudence. It argues that 
the map of relations and displacements between the object and the subject that is 
associated with melancholy in different psychoanalytical approaches can be fruit-
fully adopted for understanding of normativity. Based on a thorough re-reading of 
Freud’s Trauer und Melancholie (Mourning and Melancholy), it suggests that there 
is an irremovable component of melancholy contained in the primordial act of sepa-
ration of normativity from non-normative reality. This interpretation is confronted 
with Kelsen’s Theory of Pure Law in order to analyse in which respect the momen-
tum of self-sufficiency within normativity entails structures of melancholy. Kelsen’s 
concept of ‘effectiveness’ is proposed as a key link which explains how melan-
cholic withdrawal allows the law to interact with reality. Then the paper discusses 
Agamben’s theory of applicability and of the state of exception to demonstrate the 
law’s melancholic trap. Finally, the paper draws on Lacanian and post-Lacanian 
approaches to melancholy in order to investigate how melancholic momentum is 
inherent in the very structure of the law’s validity.
Keywords Agamben · Applicability · Kelsen · Melancholy · Normativity · 
Psychoanalysis
Introduction
Can the law have its own specific form of melancholy, deeply engrained in the very 
structure of legality? Or, to venture an even more provocative thought, can this mel-
ancholy be a condition of possibility of norm-application? Is there something within 
the law that makes it melancholic? And, if the link between melancholy and law is 
something more than an accidental figure of speech, what can the former explain in 
the functioning of the latter?
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Melancholy and law are not words that often go together. It would be too figu-
rative or too poetical, one might say, to couple them. If they are juxtaposed, as in 
Jan Klabbers’ recent European Society of International Law contribution (Klab-
bers 2018), it is usually for the purpose of highlighting the author’s dissatisfaction 
with the direction that the law or legal scholarship have taken recently; melancholy, 
there, is nothing more than a term for nostalgic reflection on the lost good times. 
Alternatively, the combination of the two terms might connote a legal professional’s 
depression (Silver 2011). There are also some more substantial theoretical accounts 
of their possible constellations, although not direct ones: melancholy and the law are 
mediated by a subject that entertains relations with both. In this perspective, Ber-
nard Edelman offered a brilliant reading of Kant’s theory of author’s rights as a pro-
tection against an individual’s melancholic folly (Edelman 2007, pp. 59–82). Here, 
however, the law has little to do with melancholy itself apart from being a bulwark 
against its colonisation of a subject. Peter Goodrich in his unfailing ingenuity pro-
posed an account of ‘melancholegalism’, an endemic condition of lawyers, ‘the par-
lous and obscure desire of souls lost in the law’ (Goodrich 2016, p. 201). Yet in this 
concept melancholy and the law are once again linked by a psychological nexus pro-
vided by a particular subject. Indeed, the law can protect a subject from herself or, 
contrariwise, plunge her into the abyss of saturnine devotion to the corpus iuris. But 
if melancholy provides an unsurpassed distant gaze of what-is-already-dead, should 
not the law itself—precisely in its intransigence and ghastly torpor—be its subject?
Since Robert Burton’s classic work on melancholy (Burton 1927/1621), it has 
become one of the most productive terms in the humanities that exploded with re-
inventions and transformations after Freud’s classic article ‘Mourning and Melan-
choly’ (Freud 1957; Radden 2000, pp. 4, 28); it would seem surprising if it had no 
true adaptation in legal studies. In modernity it lost its purely psychological dimen-
sion and expanded to explain the status of things, nature and the world itself. The 
structure of relations that melancholy connotes nowadays—as a term re-appropri-
ated by the humanities—is stunningly adaptable to legality. Moreover, the appli-
cation of psychoanalytical terms to jurisprudence has already a long tradition in 
critical legal thinking (Goodrich and Carlson 1998). This paper aims to enter this 
uncharted territory and bring the relationship between the law and melancholy to a 
properly conceptual level, beyond any individual psychology.
Trap of the Law
Before we proceed to a detailed analysis of Freudian understandings of melancholy, 
let us begin with a post-psychoanalytical working definition: melancholy is a dis-
placement in the economy of the subject in relation to the object (cf. Freud 1957, 
p. 249). In the post-Lacanian perspective the normalised concept of the object is 
developed into the notion of the Thing (Lacan 1986, pp. 95–122; Kristeva 1992, pp. 
13–15). In both cases melancholy transforms the subject’s bond with the position 
of the object as a response to some traumatic deforming force. This displacement 
distorts equilibrium between the subject and the object, thrusting the latter into an 
imaginary position of pre-determined dependence on the subject. It is only in this 
1 3
Melancholy of the Law 
way that the subject can compensate for its structural deficiency originating in the 
primordial trauma.
The first source which allows us to link this understanding of melancholy with the 
law is ancient. The Tanakh (the Hebrew Bible) has preserved a revelatory story on 
the dependence-based melancholic structure of the law. The second book of Kings 
contains a narrative on Josiah, a king of Judah reigning in the years 640–609 BCE, 
who undertook a profound politico-religious reform and reinstated fiercely mono-
theistic Judaism as a foundation of the state. Chapter 22 of the second book of Kings 
(Kings 2017) describes him in retrospect as a righteous ruler full of fear of God:
Josiah was eight years old when he began to reign; and he reigned thirty and 
one years in Jerusalem […]. And he did that which was right in the eyes of the 
LORD, and walked in all the way of David his father, and turned not aside to 
the right hand or to the left. (2 Kings 22: 1–2)
With unsurpassed succinctness the Tanakh proceeds to the central event in the 
life of Josiah (Henige 2007, p. 8). The king orders a refurbishment of the Temple. 
On this occasion Hilkiah, the high priest, makes a fearful discovery:
And Hilkiah the high priest said unto Shaphan the scribe: ‘I have found the 
book of the Law in the house of the LORD.’ And Hilkiah delivered the book 
to Shaphan, and he read it. And Shaphan the scribe came to the king, and 
brought back word unto the king, and said: ‘Thy servants have poured out the 
money that was found in the house, and have delivered it into the hand of the 
workmen that have the oversight of the house of the LORD.’ And Shaphan the 
scribe told the king, saying: ‘Hilkiah the priest hath delivered me a book.’ And 
Shaphan read it before the king. And it came to pass, when the king had heard 
the words of the book of the Law, that he rent his clothes. (2 Kings 22: 8–11)
Suddenly, after years of oblivion, the book of the Law is discovered. According 
to the story, throughout this time it had not been known and, as a result, not obeyed. 
The Jewish Law at that time paid little attention to the question of error or unaware-
ness of its subjects. Therefore even those who acted against the Law without the 
consciousness of it were objectively at guilt. Hence the only thing that was left for 
the king was to tear his clothes, more in an act of prostration rather than repentance. 
Josiah sends his emissaries, the high priest among them, to inquire the Lord, as he 
fears the worst retaliation for years of neglecting the Law:
Go ye, inquire of the LORD for me, and for the people, and for all Judah, 
concerning the words of this book that is found; for great is the wrath of the 
LORD that is kindled against us, because our fathers have not hearkened unto 
the words of this book, to do according unto all that which is written concern-
ing us. (2 Kings 22: 13)
The discovery of the book of the Law not only actualises his guilt at the irrepara-
ble negligence of the Torah, but also transforms the perception of what was hap-
pening to Judah: all misfortunes suddenly appeared in the light of the Law as the 
Lord’s wrath for ignoring the norms. Just with one contingent discovery the Law 
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emerges, producing guilt and changing the meaning of the past and the present. 
Inquired via a prophetess, God responds in defence of the violated Law:
Behold, I will bring evil upon this place, and upon the inhabitants thereof, 
even all the words of the book which the king of Judah hath read; because 
they have forsaken Me, and have offered unto other gods, that they might 
provoke Me with all the work of their hands; therefore My wrath shall be 
kindled against this place, and it shall not be quenched. (2 Kings 23: 16–17)
Josiah himself obtained a special grace; due to his loyalty to the Lord, he was 
promised to die early enough not to see the calamity of Judah. Notwithstanding 
God’s answer, the king attempted to make up for the past sins. Chapter  23 of 
the second book of Kings provides a detailed list of his anger-imbued actions: 
Josiah renewed the covenant with God, promising to keep the Law; he began a 
massive anti-idolatrous campaign which involved destroying pagan vessels and 
statues, killing pagan priests, defiling places of worship and eradicating any signs 
of cults other than Judaism. He destroyed the altars of past kings who misguided 
Israel, and burned bones of the idolatrous. Finally, he commanded to observe the 
Passover, which had not been celebrated during the period of oblivion of the Law.
The whole story is concluded with a Job-like paradoxical denouement. First 
the Tanakh expresses outright appreciation of Josiah’s actions:
And like unto him was there no king before him, that turned to the LORD 
with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his might, according to 
all the law of Moses; neither after him arose there any like him. (2 Kings 
23: 25)
But the Tanakh then declares all his deeds fundamentally futile in relation to the 
violation of the Law:
Notwithstanding the LORD turned not from the fierceness of His great 
wrath, wherewith His anger was kindled against Judah, because of all the 
provocations wherewith Manasseh had provoked Him. (2 Kings 23: 26)
The judgment was pronounced as structurally irrevocable. No repentance could 
make up for violation of the Law. Its norms, apparently given once and for all, 
could not make any allowances for the facts. This stunning intransigence is attrib-
uted to the unabating wrath of God—but is there not something in the very posi-
tion of the Law that makes it structurally intransigent?
This story still puzzles biblical researchers. The book of the Law  
discovered in the Temple is widely believed to be Deuteronomy (Stott 2005, p. 
155; Henige 2007, p. 3). Nonetheless, it is hardly sensible to take the story at 
face value; much more probably the second book of Kings provides a retroac-
tive, pseudo-historical narrative on the centralisation of cult and expansion of 
fierce Jewish monotheism. Discontinuities in 2 Kings might attest to this inter-
pretation (Janzen 2013, p. 350). If so, then the ‘discovery’ of the Book would 
be a distorted explanation of the composition of Deuteronomy, necessary for 
the purpose of assuring coherence in the history of Israel after the exile (Noth 
1 3
Melancholy of the Law 
1960, pp. 274–277; Henige 2007, p. 13) or aiming at rhetorical endorsement of 
reforms in the times of Josiah (Conrad 1992, pp. 45–59). The physical existence 
of ‘the Book’ and its ‘discovery’ are therefore highly dubitable (Stott 2005, p. 
167; Davies 2005, p. 70), although some researchers still believe them not to be 
implausible (Cogan 1998, p. 346; Henige 2007, p. 3). Scarcity of reliable sources 
allows the imagination to produce almost all interpretations within the logical 
limits determined by the story’s plot (Henige 2007, pp. 6–15).
No matter which option is actually true, the story conveys a thought-provoking 
vision of the law. Firstly, the law, once established, has been always already here. 
No matter if respected or not, it awaits the subjects as a pre-determined trap. In 
this respect the two interpretative options of the story—that the Book was actually 
obliterated and then rediscovered or, alternatively, that the story provides a mythical 
grounding of the establishment of the law—are indifferentiable. Even if the law was 
composed at that time, it is posited as having been in existence before. The emerging 
law produces its own history. From the point of this history the subjects of the law 
are always in delay.
Secondly, there is an irreducible component of timelessness in the law. Obvi-
ously, the second book of Kings refers to religious law, in itself conceived of as 
eternal. But given that this law was also actually codified, we might see its inherent 
eternity only as extreme intensification of the law’s usual timelessness. In the realm 
of the law, until its amendment or deposition, time does not flow. The book of the 
Law might be buried for centuries; when unearthed, it instantly rivets the present to 
the moment when the norms were established.
Thirdly, violation of the law is, ultimately, irreparable. This is the gist of the 
story: if a norm of the law is breached, it does not affect the law no matter how 
long the violation lasts. Such a ‘biblical hard-line Kelsenism’ brings the norm/fact 
dualism to its end. The law exists in its own, immutable temporality, which is never 
affected by its ineffectiveness. There can be no desuetudo of which to conceive. Vio-
lation is as eternal as the law itself, and such is the punishment. The only condition 
is that the law is discovered. Then it returns to reality with surprising effectiveness 
because it not only achieves what it prescribes, but also perpetuates its reign by pro-
duction of indelible guilt.
Finally, violation appears and entails consequences only after the law is 
unearthed. As long as the book of the Law remained isolated from the eyes of its 
subjects, not only guilt was absent, but also lamentable effects of transgression did 
not see the daylight. But as soon as the law was revealed, irreparable guilt for the 
past emerged and calamities began to ravage Israel. It is transparency of the law that 
makes it work, although even while concealed it preserves its potential to re-emerge 
and demand settling the score. Within the law nothing is ever forgotten, but, at best, 
only temporarily suspended.
Let us now try to bring these conclusions closer to the psychoanalytical field, 
to which melancholy belongs. If the violation of the law is seen as a loss, then 
there might be two general strategies of response from the part of the law. The first 
one is mourning: the law makes its peace with the breach, negotiating a third way 
between total disrespect of its norms and the already impossible norm-application. 
‘Mourning’ in the law would mean making allowances for the fact in a pragmatic, 
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reality-centred manner. But there is also a second strategy: melancholy. In a Freud-
ian approach, melancholy consists in staunch refusal to acknowledge the loss. The 
‘melancholic’ law perpetuates it, making the violation eternal and irreparable. God’s 
personhood behind the law adds to it even more psychoanalytic flavour: through its 
words the law speaks itself in its inconsolable perpetuation of the breach. The sub-
jects of the law are thrown into the position of eternal dependence and guilt. In this 
lies the crux of Josiah’s story and the key to exploring the link between the law and 
melancholy.
Psychoanalytic Account of Melancholy and the Force of the Law
Let us now return to Freud’s understanding of melancholy in more detail in order to 
grasp its consequences for the law.
Famously, Freud contrasts mourning and melancholy as two reactions to a loss of 
an object, which may be of multifarious types, from a beloved person to an abstract 
value, such as liberty or an ideal (1957, pp. 243, 247). Mourning has its structurally 
embedded end: it involves gradual recognition of irrevocability of the loss, which 
leads to withdrawal of libidinal relations with the object and healing of the subject 
(Freud 1957, pp. 244–245). On the contrary, melancholy perpetualises itself. It is no 
longer about the loss of the object: the loss engulfs the very relationship between 
the object and the subject. In melancholy, the subject is ultimately impoverished and 
wallows in self-abasement (Freud 1957, p. 246).
Here Freud adds a crucial twist: the subject ‘must surely be right in some way and 
be describing something that is as it seems to him to be’ (1957, p. 246). The nega-
tive disposition of the subject towards itself has a real, although displaced cause. By 
accusing and deprecating itself, the subject in fact targets the object of its former 
strong cathexis (Freud 1957, p. 248). Referring to the patients of his practice, Freud 
remarks: ‘All this is possible only because the reactions expressed in their behaviour 
still proceed from a mental constellation of revolt, which has then, by a certain pro-
cess, passed over into the crushed state of melancholia’ (1957, p. 248).
Proceeding from psychology of individuals towards a more general perspective, 
it might be noticed that Freudian understanding of melancholy involves a permanent 
struggle of the subject with a foreign intrusion by which it is inhabited. On the one 
hand, this intrusion is constantly reviled and revolted against, which only fuels the 
subject’s self-loathing. On the other hand, the subject seems irretrievably possessed 
by the shadow of the object in itself. Due to its primordial unacceptance of the loss, 
it is unable to get rid of this haunting spectre to the point that it painfully tolerates its 
own splitting. In anticipation of the adaptation of melancholy to the context of legal-
ity, it seems crucial to notice that Freud understands this condition to produce within 
the subject a hollow space that mimics the real object. Melancholy is a game of 
shadows: the object, lost in reality, is preserved as a spectre within the subject—with 
all the interplay of love and hate moving into the subject.
As a result, there is a displaced core of truth in each statement tainted by mel-
ancholy. As Freud notices regarding his melancholic patients, ‘[t]hey are not 
ashamed and do not hide themselves, since everything derogatory that they say 
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about themselves is at bottom said about someone else’; therefore, ‘they make 
the greatest nuisance of themselves, and always seem as though they felt slighted 
and had been treated with great injustice’ (Freud 1957, p. 248). The melancholic 
position evinces the aura of superiority over the object, albeit distorted by the 
change of vector of contempt. The structure of melancholy makes the subject pri-
mordially elevated in relation to the object: the latter is always thrown into the 
condition of guilt stemming from some injustice that seems to have been com-
mitted in regard to the subject. Whenever the subject deprecates itself, in fact it is 
the object to which the deprecation refers. As a result of this displacement, mel-
ancholy is capable of unleashing unprecedented potential of sadism and hatred 
(Freud 1957, pp. 251–252).
Freudian melancholy is, in a sense, based on a deliberate choice of the subject. 
Instead of confronting the loss in reality, a melancholic position establishes ‘an 
identification of the ego with the abandoned object. Thus the shadow of the object 
fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency, as 
though it were an object, the forsaken object’ (Freud 1957, p. 249). In melancholy 
the subject brings the relationship with the object to its own ground by identifying 
with it and splitting itself. Yet the victory is partial: the subject now struggles with a 
tendency to get rid of the incorporated subject which disturbs it, even if, at the same 
time, it wants to keep the object in, in order to dominate over it (Freud 1957, pp. 
256–257). Melancholy entails profound ambivalence and permanent structural ten-
sion over the relationship with reality and the object that was part of it.
How could this theoretical account of melancholy be adapted to legal theory? As 
I noticed previously, violation of the law is, within the law itself, a properly irrepa-
rable act which can never be erased from the registry. At the same time it touches 
upon the mysterious locus in which the law faces reality, the same locus which—as 
I will demonstrate later—Agamben interrogates in his work on suspension of the 
law. Perhaps then the intransigence of the law, depicted so tellingly by the Book of 
Kings, seems to be structurally embedded in the detachment from reality that founds 
normativity of the law. Violation of the law, if seen as a loss, only repeats the pri-
mordial loss on which the whole edifice of the law is built.
From this perspective the relation between the law and reality—to which the law 
relates, among others, through the concepts of validity and application—could be 
seen as a structurally disturbed melancholic displacement. Perhaps the law emerges 
by absorbing reality into itself through identification. Within this ‘melancholic 
vision of the law’, reality is an ambivalent incorporated object that the law simul-
taneously aims to withhold in itself and get rid of. When facing the true reality, for 
example in the process of application, the law relates to it via the redoubling that 
it performs: each relation to reality is mediated through the ideal reality within the 
law itself. The law would be thus afflicted by fundamental ambivalence between the 
temptation to be self-sufficient and the need to be applied and effective. It wants 
simultaneously to determine reality as something external, and absorb it fully into 
itself. Following Nicolas Abraham’s and Maria Torok’s terminology (1987, p. 266), 




Accordingly, the law is as intransigent as a melancholic subject. Its object is in 
the position of permanent inadequacy. Each element of the relation between the law 
and reality is scrutinised in the light of its discrepancy with the normative ideal. In 
its melancholic position, the law never forgets or pardons: the registry of violations 
only mounts.
The Portrait of Hans Kelsen as a Legal Scholar of Melancholy
This melancholic ambivalence of the law is clearly discernible in one of the founda-
tional works of twentieth-century legal theory, Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. 
As I will attempt to demonstrate, the paradigm it inaugurated—focused on analysing 
pure normativity—is mired in the melancholic position that the law may assume. 
In his balky struggle to found legal theory on the autonomy of normativity, Kelsen 
enters the area where melancholy of the law is most acutely palpable.
Let us begin by noticing that when he develops his vision of normativity, Kelsen 
clumsily confronts the problem of the relationship between the law and reality. Pure 
Theory of Law begins with the well-known Kant-inspired declaration of fundamen-
tal difference between ought and is, the norm and the fact (Kelsen 2005, pp. 5–6). 
‘This dualism’, Kelsen immediately adds, ‘does not mean, however, that there is 
no relationship between is and ought’ (2005, p. 6). The law cannot be admitted to 
hover in the air as the untouchable Laputa island from Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver; 
it needs to relate to reality. Yet precisely in this relation the law reveals its melan-
cholic redoubling. According to Kelsen, the law relates to reality just as the behav-
iour stipulated by a norm relates to the actual behaviour (2005, p. 6). In other words, 
this relation is already determined by the normative framework; the norm acts as ‘a 
scheme of interpretation’ (Kelsen 2005, p. 3). The law is in relationship to reality 
through a normatively determined spectre reality that it itself produces.
The key to this redoubling is nothing less than the process in which a subjective 
norm becomes objectivised by finding support in the Grundnorm, ‘a presupposition 
establishing the objective validity of the norms of a moral or a legal order’ (Kelsen 
2005, p. 8). Without going here into endless discussions on the actual meaning of 
Kelsen’s Grundnorm (see Bindreiter 2003; Raz 1974), it should be noticed that the 
process of objectivisation which turns individual will into a general norm is, psy-
choanalytically speaking, tantamount to the primordial melancholic dispossession 
of reality. By objectivising itself, a particular will is elevated to the rank of parallel, 
universally recognisable reality. It passes from the realm of being to the realm of 
validity; and it is validity that becomes ‘the specific existence of a norm’ (Kelsen 
2005, p. 10). The emergence of the Grundnorm is a momentary act in which per-
spectives are switched, as if in Žižekean ‘parallax view’ (Žižek 2009). Just as the 
appearance of melancholy is not an act within reality, but an act that displaces the 
relationship to it, so is Grundnorm-based normativity a disturbance in the existence 
of what is real.
It is now that the melancholic ambivalence of the law comes to the fore. Kelsen 
addresses the relationship between validity and effectiveness of norms by tak-
ing a false middle path between the two, but he does it in order to demonstrate his 
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willingness to reach a compromise with his staunch Kantianism. The norm exists 
regardless of whether it is followed; it always precedes its application, so reality is 
put in the position of primordial dependence on it (Kelsen 2005, p. 11). Yet at the 
same time Kelsen is ready to acknowledge that ‘[a] general legal norm is regarded 
as valid only if the human behaviour that is regulated by it actually conforms with 
it, at least to some degree’ (2005, p. 11). An eye well-versed in deconstruction will 
immediately identify this ‘some degree’ as a crucial locus of aporia. ‘A minimum 
of effectiveness is a condition of validity’, Kelsen adds (Kelsen, 2005, p. 11), notic-
ing at the same time that the norm must preserve the possibility of being violated, 
because a norm which acts like a law of nature is ‘senseless’ (2005, p. 11).
Melancholy is not an entire world in itself: it is relating to the world through 
its suspension and re-doubling. For this reason there always should be some link 
between the melancholic spectral reality and external reality, otherwise the redou-
bling is senseless. It is a fundamental error to see melancholy as a passive defence, 
or even a complete withdrawal from the world: melancholy wants to be active in 
relation to reality, but with other means. In Freud’s theory, the principal reason for 
the ego’s identification with the object is not a renunciation of it: that would be actu-
ally a sign of healing. A melancholic ego absorbs the object precisely for the fact of 
not being capable to let it go. It is not able to relate to it as something entirely exter-
nal which needs to be respected in its separation and abandoned if necessary. What 
is manifest in melancholy is precisely not abandonment of reality, but too strong 
a relation to it which cannot be overcome otherwise than through forced absorp-
tion of it into the subject. The ‘depressive position’, to use Melanie Klein’s term 
(Klein 1975, pp. 13–15), would therefore condition the very link between the law 
and reality.
Kelsen’s account of normativity reveals the law’s obsession with reality. In his 
vision the law is both separate from reality, unshakeable in its normative self-suffi-
ciency, and dependent on it to the point of losing its very existence—that is, valid-
ity—if it does not prove effective. In order to navigate between the Scylla of validity 
and Charybdis of effectiveness Kelsen proposes a seemingly compromise solution:
Just as the norm […] as the meaning of an act is not identical with the act […], 
in the same way is the validity of a legal norm not identical with its effec-
tiveness; the effectiveness of a legal order as a whole and the effectiveness 
of a single legal norm are—just as the norm-creating act—the condition for 
the validity; effectiveness is the condition in the sense that a legal order as a 
whole, and a single legal norm, can no longer be regarded as valid when they 
cease to be effective. (Kelsen 2005, pp. 211–212)
In other words, normativity is born only from the establishment of the Grundnorm, 
that is—the law’s absorption of reality and identification with it. But in order to sur-
vive, norms need to be recognised as valid, for which they require effectiveness (see 
also Kelsen 1992, p. 60). In the same manner melancholy arises from a primordial 
displacement in relation to the subject, but will burn out if it does not bring gains 
by entangling the subject. Normativity, just like melancholy, becomes useless when 
turned into ultimate passivity dissociated from reality to which it relates. Kelsen’s 
‘compromise’ is not a sign of weakness, let alone a token of common sense in taking 
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a step back from most radical Kantianism: it is a crucial bolt that allows normativity 
to engage in reality through redoubling.
In its melancholic dimension, normativity would then be close to the modern 
understanding of melancholy. Dürer’s famous engraving Melencolia I (1514), which 
portrays it allegorically as a reflexive woman surrounded by scientific instruments, 
exposes the ambivalence of scientific cognition explored by Aby Warburg and his 
disciples, Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl (Traverso 2016, pp. 
41–42). Melancholy is both a method of conquering the world with the scientific 
gaze and the exhausted disappointment stemming from the inability to grasp it fully. 
‘It is a confession and an expression of Faust’s “insuperable ignorance”’, as Kliban-
sky, Panofsky and Saxl put it (1979, p. 365). Melancholy is therefore far from being 
passive: it rather attempts to win over reality through reflection and self-reflection 
while recognising the limits of cognition.
In his ‘pure theory of law’ Kelsen inadvertently reveals the melancholic under-
pinning of the law. It is therefore of little surprise that some of the influential criti-
cisms targeted at his thought re-enact the classic anti-melancholic positions. The 
famous interwar polemics between him and Carl Schmitt embody the conflict 
between melancholic ‘withdrawn activeness’ and glorification of vitality and force 
of real life. Schmitt, expounding his concept of exception in Political Theology, 
famously claims that
The exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the 
exception proves everything. It confirms not only the rule but also its exist-
ence, which derives only from the exception. In the exception the power of 
real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid with 
repetition. (Schmitt 1985, p. 15)
Schmitt’s vitality, however, is not the expression of primordial or ‘authentic’ life. 
It only arises out of the refusal of the melancholic position of the law and, in this 
sense, has a reactionary character despite its calls for ‘the power of real life’. This is 
clearly recognisable from the negative reference to the ‘crust’ of death-stricken nor-
mativity that he wants to overcome. For Schmitt, (Kelsenian) normativity is ‘torpid 
with repetition’, just as melancholic patients from Freud’s portrayal. Nonetheless, 
what Schmitt proposes as a cure is not abandonment of melancholy, but rather a kind 
of a ‘normative mania’ in which the melancholic structure is preserved at its bottom, 
yet suspended for the sake of real life.
In other words, the debate between Kelsen and Schmitt (Cercel 2018, pp. 
18–45)—if read in the light of melancholy of the law—does not have its central axis 
in the question whether the law is melancholic or not. Both scholars avow it implic-
itly: Kelsen when building the tower of self-sufficient normativity only to acquiesce 
its necessary link to reality, and Schmitt when he summons the power of real life 
against normativity mired in undead repetition. They differ rather in the approach 
to how the melancholy-stricken law should be approached. Kelsen seems to accept 
melancholy of the law as the fundamental framework of its influence on reality. The 
redoubling that the law performs on it is a necessary element of the reign-through-
absorption strategy. Schmitt is not, as it could be expected, an adherent of normative 
‘mourning’ against melancholy. What he attempts to unleash are the powers inherent 
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in normativity, but covered with its melancholic structure. His quest of the sovereign 
grip embedded in the law through the device of exception is tantamount to a ges-
ture of re-appropriating melancholy by seeking its primordial act of separation from 
reality.
Melancholy of the Inner Suspension of the Law
The Schmittian exception would be therefore not a point in which life breaks with 
the melancholic torpidity of the law, but rather a privileged site in which melancholy 
of the law becomes visible and requires an adequate response. Giorgio Agamben’s 
philosophy of the law provides here a telling example: when stripped of the Fascist-
like celebration of life and reality, the exception becomes the crucial aspect of nor-
mativity in which the relationship between the law and the fact is laid bare. What 
happens at this site is the confrontation of the norm and being, mediated by the 
inherent suspensibility of the law. Agamben demonstrates that the law does not sim-
ply apply to reality, but each time overcomes its primordial melancholic withdrawal 
in order to reach being. The result, as once suggested by Wittgenstein in Kripke’s 
reinterpretation (Kripke 1982), is undeterminable in the last instance, because the 
leap from normativity to being is in itself not guided by rules.
Let us then look briefly at Agamben’s take on melancholy of the law which is 
implicit in his theory of exception. One of his canonical definitions of exception 
accentuates its relation to suspension of norms:
The exception is a kind of exclusion. What is excluded from the general rule is 
an individual case. But the most proper characteristic of the exception is that 
what is excluded in it is not, on account of being excluded, absolutely without 
relation to the rule. On the contrary, what is excluded in the exception main-
tains itself in relation to the rule in the form of the rule’s suspension. The rule 
applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it. The 
state of exception is thus not the chaos that precedes order but rather the situa-
tion that results from its suspension. (Agamben 2005a, p. 39)
For Agamben, suspension—revealed in the exception—is inherent in the law, but 
not exclusive to it. On the contrary, with a generous metaphysical generalisation 
Agamben presents the suspension of action or applicability not only as the propen-
sity of language, but even as part and parcel of being human. In Creazione e anar-
chia Agamben notices that ‘the human is the living being that exists eminently in 
the dimension of potential, of being-able-to and being-able-not-to’ [del potere e del 
poter-non]’ (Agamben 2019, p. 20; 2017a, p. 37). The ability to ‘not do’, to with-
draw one’s action and preserve it in the state of potency is characteristic of an ani-
mal possessed by language. This potency is embodied in a maxim referring to God’s 
revelation to Moses in the burning, but non-consuming fire: ‘ignis ardens non com-
burens’ (Agamben 2019, p. 23). Potency is not only capable of action, it is pregnant 
with it, but reveals itself when the action is suspended.
Agamben develops a special term in order to grasp the language (and, as cor-
ollaries, art and techne) that becomes deactivated in its potency: inoperativity 
 P. Tacik 
1 3
(inoperosità) [2019, p. 27; 2017a, p. 47; 2017b, p. 139; 2005b, pp. 95–99; 2014, 
pp. 130–131, pp. 350–351]. Accordingly, poetry is the celebration of the inopera-
tivity of language: ‘an operation in language that deactivates and renders inopera-
tive its communicative and informative functions in order to open them to a new 
possible use’ (Agamben 2019, p. 27).
The inoperativity dormant in language is visible also in law. In Agambenian 
portrayal it is not the suspension of the law that demands explication; on the 
contrary, the law is based on suspension and, in fact, it is its applicability that 
remains a puzzling enigma. In this staunch commitment to melancholic normativ-
ity Agamben radicalises even the Kelsenian dualism of the law and the fact:
while morphologically identical to the verbal expression of the indicative, 
the command […] does not manifest the being or non-being of something, it 
does not describe or deny a state of things, and without being for this reason 
false, it does not refer to anything existing in the world. It is necessary to 
avoid with all due caution the equivocation according to which the meaning 
of the imperative would consist in the act of its execution. …We must there-
fore admit unreservedly that nothing, in the world as it is, corresponds to the 
imperative. (Agamben 2019, pp. 50–51)
Consequently, Agamben follows Schmitt to the roots of primordial separation 
from reality that builds up normativity, but does not find there any ‘power of 
life’. At the bottom of normativity there is nothing but inoperativity which stems 
from the melancholic absorption of reality into the law. Agamben offers a thor-
ough reappraisal of Kelsen in which duality between Sein and Sollen is properly 
inexplicable and based on a more fundamental rift between two ontologies, the 
ontology of being [essere] and of obligation [dover-essere] (Agamben 2012, pp. 
140–143). When this rift is grasped in the most radical way, normativity discloses 
its insurmountable solitude.
If so, how can the law be applied at all? If interpreted radically enough, Agam-
ben seems to draw the ultimate conclusions from Wittgenstein’s reflection on rules 
(Wittgenstein 1974, pp. 74–87). ‘Proper application’ of the law does not exist:
in the case of law, the application of a norm is in no way contained within 
the norm and cannot be derived from it; otherwise, there would have been 
no need to create the grand edifice of trial law. Just as between language and 
world, so between the norm and its application there is no internal nexus that 
allows one to be derived immediately from the other. (Agamben 2005a, p. 40)
Naturally, this nexus is, in Agamben’s theory, safeguarded by the state of excep-
tion. Accordingly, each act of applying the law is twofold. The law bifurcates into 
the force-of-law, which hovers spectrally over the ‘application act’, and the excep-
tion, which assures that some act is effectively produced. On the one hand, the 
law may somehow correspond to an executed act (cf. Agamben 2019, p. 50) and, 
in this sense, pass off for a rule that ‘was applied’. But even if this act corresponds 
perfectly to the rule, the melancholic inertia of the law—its self-ensconcement in 
the normative—is preserved. It is for the essential incompatibility of the law with 
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the world that each act of its ‘application’ leaves it unsatisfied. In other words, 
there is a melancholic excess not only in violation of the law, but even its purport-
edly ‘successful’ application. What Agamben names ‘force-of-law’ (Agamben 
2005a, p. 40) is nothing but the law crystallised in its melancholic position.
After the rule is ‘applied’, there is still some remainder of normativity which is 
never consumed by the act. Therefore perceiving the law from the perspective of 
its application or effectiveness is defective as long as we focus just on the real act 
which was triggered by it. It does not mean, however, that effectiveness or relation 
to the world is inconsequential in the law; Kelsen himself desperately defended this 
element of normativity. But effectiveness needs to be understood just as mere jux-
taposition of ought and is, a kind of après-coup injustice done to the law from an 
abstract position. To say that a norm was effective is tantamount to telling a mel-
ancholic in despair that at least she managed to get up in the morning precisely at 
the moment when the abyss of the coming day is yawning before her. Meanwhile, 
between the law and the fact there is the irreducible zone of melancholy of the law. 
Even effective norms cast the black melancholic light upon their ‘acts’. In this sense, 
the law can never square with the facts without losing its normative character and 
the melancholic residue it produces.
It is for this reason that Agamben is pushed to seek perspectives in which the 
law would be ‘consumed’ not through acting according to its injunctions, but in the 
recognition of its inner suspendability. His work on monastic life, Altissima povertà, 
develops an interpretation of lectio continua, a practice of liturgical reading of the 
law. Agamben argues that in lectio continua
The text of the rule is thus not only a text in which the distinction between 
writing and reading tends to become blurred, but also one in which writing 
and life, being and living become properly indiscernible in the form of total 
liturgicization of life and a vivification of liturgy that is just as entire. (Agam-
ben 2013, p. 82)
Thus the whole ‘redemptive’ dimension of Agamben’s work, which aims at loosen-
ing the ontology of injunction, may be interpreted as passivisation of the law within 
its melancholic residue. Analogically, the messianic elements, present especially in Il 
tempo che resta, are based on the assumption that the Messiah’s acts render the law 
inoperative: ‘[m]essianic katargēsis does not merely abolish; it preserves and brings 
to fulfilment’ (Agamben 2005b, p. 99). But this fulfilment does not bring a new 
quality to the law, it rather aims to recuperate the dimension of inoperativity deeply 
imbedded in the very construction of normativity. Contemplative inoperativity, hailed 
as a redemptive path (Agamben 2014, pp. 350–351), would therefore be nothing but 
allowing oneself to be mired in melancholy. And that, notoriously, opens up a thou-
sand gates to the cognoscenti but appears just as a multiplied illusion to all the others.
Ultimately, Agamben’s path would be the utter triumph of melancholy of the law. 
As we saw in Kelsen, the melancholic construction of the law appears precisely in 
its contact with reality: apparent withdrawal did not have for its objective to abandon 
reality, but to dominate it by the use of re-doubling. Yet in Agamben melancholy 
turns into the final victory of the law. Fixed in its inoperativity, it no longer needs to 
be applied. The melancholic obstacle in relations between ought and is disappears, 
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thereby opening up the perspective of eternal life within the realm of melancholy 
which finally engulfed reality without any remainder. Normativity no longer needs 
to be disturbed by the painstaking process of application: it now fulfils itself by 
being studied.
Lacanian Icing on the Cake
Lacanian psychoanalysis would be more eager to link the law either with the estab-
lishment of the Symbolic and its (non-)correlate, the Real, or with the sinthome 
(Murray 2005)—rather than to analyse the law’s melancholic position. But the holy 
trinity of Lacan’s examples for the intransigence of the law, Antigone (Lacan 1986, 
pp. 295–327), Kant and Sade (Lacan 1999, pp. 243–269; Lacan 1986, pp. 95–101, 
pp. 222–233; Lacan 1975, pp. 80–84; Zupančič 2000), reveal the intriguingly irre-
movable melancholic residue within the entanglement of the Symbolic and the Real.
First, the risk of ‘legal radicalisation’ understood as the law’s swerving out of 
the control exercised by ‘non-normative reality’ remains an irremovable possibility 
within normativity. It is a one-way path of temptation: once adopted, it leads directly 
to Kant’s allegedly ‘inhumane’ praise of veracity for all costs, including life (Kant 
1993; Varden 2010). This temptation can never be tamed otherwise than by a refer-
ence to ‘common sense’ which acts as a corrective mechanism for normativity. Yet 
the paradox consists in the fact that within normativity there is no such mechanism.
Second, ‘effectiveness’ remains a fetish that allows the law to break with its dan-
gerous normative self-sufficiency. But as evidenced by Kelsen, it is always an inco-
herent, begrudging compromise than cannot be well expounded theoretically. When 
‘effectiveness’ comes up in legal reasoning it is as if a blind spot was reached: per-
suasiveness of arguments dissipates and is replaced with classic rhetorical gestures 
from the state of exception repertoire: ‘it must be done anyway’, ‘let’s have com-
mon sense’ or ‘it cannot go on like this’. Law should be effective, otherwise why 
should we have law? The problem is—as demonstrated by Lacan’s Antigone—that 
by establishing normativity we unleash forces much more powerful than the alleged 
reality itself; at the same time, they are paralysed with melancholy to which only 
Agamben’s calls for studying the law can do justice.
If effectiveness is understood as the law’s capability of influencing ‘non-norma-
tive reality’, than this reality itself is a legal construct that acts as a interrupter within 
normativity’s proneness to melancholic self-enclosure. What Kelsen describes as an 
already legally pre-prepared reality that the law applies to would therefore be just 
the fuse that the law uses to protect itself against the short circuit of normative mel-
ancholy. It is applicability as imagined within the law. But it is precisely for this rea-
son, through action-in-inaction, that the melancholy of the law is part and parcel of 
its reign. And perhaps this is the proper sense of Derrida’s otherwise oversimplistic 
view of the law’s foundation only upon itself (1994, p. 34).
It might seem absurd and weirdly sentimental to follow the law in its mourning of 
a violation. But within normativity there is no obstacle to interpreting the following 
description of a melancholic by Kristeva to the law as such:
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Ever since that archaic attachment the depressed person has the impression of 
having been deprived of an unnameable, supreme good, of something unrepre-
sentable, that perhaps only devouring might represent, or an invocation might 
point out, but no word could signify. Consequently, for such a person, no erotic 
object could replace the irreplaceable perception of a place or preobject con-
fining the libido or severing the bonds of desire. Knowingly disinherited of the 
Thing, the depressed person wanders in pursuit of continuously disappointing 
adventures and loves; or else retreats, disconsolate and aphasic, alone with the 
unnamed Thing. (Kristeva 1992, p. 13)
Conclusions
Melancholy is an indispensable shadow of the very foundation of normativity. If the 
law emerges through re-doubling of reality and identification with its spectral, nor-
matively reconstituted counterpart, it cannot forgo a melancholic disposition. The 
eternity of the inner realm of the law, so well discernible in Josiah’s story, is a gain 
for which the law pays with a melancholic loss. But through this loss it reigns over 
its subjects who find themselves in the position of unsurpassable belatedness. The 
law is never lost; it may be at best obliviated. On the law’s own ground, one can 
never win with it. Just as discussions with a melancholic may not be technically 
won, but only circumnavigated, so the law can be violated, but never appeased. In 
such a situation the law goes underground and turns reality into a realm of oblivion 
built upon the menacing possibility of rediscovering the breached norm. The more 
intransigent the law is, the more its reign over reality resembles Abraham’s and 
Torok’s account of melancholics who denigrate themselves in order to receive extol-
ment from their object and demonstrate pride drawn from its misery (1987, p. 274).
Melancholy of the law is an uncomfortable quality. Experienced, tacitly or explic-
itly, both by legal scholars and practitioners, it is usually either muffled by referring 
to the abyssal polysemy of interpretation or jumped over with expeditious applica-
tion of legal measures in the spirit of the state of exception. But the structural inef-
fectiveness of the law is an elephant in the room. The law revealed in its melancholic 
position displays similarly embarrassing features as a depressive patient: it is self-
centred, inert as a block of matter, imbued with morbid indifference to life. Just as a 
melancholic who believes everything to be lost in order not to suffer from a real loss, 
so does the law protect its vulnerability against reality. The eternity that opens up in 
the intransigence of normativity—making all violations irredeemable—renders the 
law unassailable on its own ground. Thus the menace of melancholy hovers over the 
law’s applicability as its inner irremovable correlate.
‘There is no greater cause of melancholy than idleness, no better cure than 
business’, Robert Burton once claimed with his frivolous optimism (1927, p. 16). 
Indeed, the law arises from the idleness that elevates normativity above reality. But 
business, or rather application, is to the law nothing but a palliative.
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